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Abstract We analyze the impact of trade integration on plant TFP using Chilean
plant-level data (1982–1999) and 3-digit bilateral trade flows. Our contribution is to
disentangle the impact of export and import barriers, estimated as border effects
within a multilateral context. A fall in export barriers is positively correlated with
plant productivity in traded sectors. The reduction of import barriers, however, can
only be associated to productivity improvements in export-oriented sectors. In
import-competing sectors a robust positive correlation shows up between plant
productivity and protection. We then test several channels linking trade integration
and firm productivity.
Keywords Trade barriers  Plant productivity  Firm heterogeneity 
Plant-level data
JEL Classification F1  F4  O1
1 Introduction
Trade liberalization was at the core of reform packages carried out in many
developing economies during the 1980s. In this paper we revisit the case of Chile,
one of the earliest and most radical examples of trade liberalization. We aim at
testing the link between trade integration and productivity in Chilean manufacturing
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plants. At the micro level, the impact of trade reforms is generally studied from a
unilateral perspective through direct measures of trade costs or through aggregate
trade ratios that may neglect several features of trade integration. The novelty of this
paper is to estimate trade barriers in a multilateral context to disentangle within a
unique framework, the effect of export- and import-oriented policies on plant
productivity.
By differentiating between export and import barriers we deal with the multiple
channels linking trade integration and plant productivity. This task of identification
is important since the underlying forces can go in opposite directions. The reduction
of import barriers increases foreign competition, which is often viewed as a positive
engine of productivity (Pavcnik 2002; Amiti and Konings 2007). It pushes the least
productive firms to cease production and surviving ones to trim down their
inefficiencies. However, the presence of increasing returns to scale and imperfect
competition may modify the relationship between import competition and plant
productivity (Devarajan and Rodrik 1989; Rodrik 1992). One consequence of scale
economies is precisely that average cost falls as output increases. In this case,
foreign competition reduces domestic sales restricting the possibility to exploit scale
economies.
Import-oriented policies not only implies the exposition to foreign competition.
They also determine the extent of foreign technology transmissions. In developing
countries, the access to high-quality capital equipment and intermediate goods from
developed countries enables firms to raise their productivity level. Using plant-level
data, Schor (2004) for Brazil, and Amiti and Konings (2007) for Indonesia show
that input tariff reductions boost productivity gains. Similarly, Kasahara and
Rodriguez (2008) for Chile find that the use of imported intermediates foster plant
productivity.
On the export side, trade integration allows firms to benefit from positive
spillovers stemming from foreign markets. The literature suggests learning-by-
exporting as a plausible mechanism to explain a positive impact of trade
liberalization on plant productivity. While the question is still empirically open,
there is some evidence on ex post productivity gains arising from knowledge and
expertise gained in the export process.1
These different mechanisms of trade liberalization call for further analysis on
the multiple dimensions of trade. We carry out a three-step empirical strategy.
Firstly, we obtain estimates of plant total factor productivity (TFP) by estimating
the production function at 2-digit industry level while addressing simultaneity
issues thanks to the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology. These estimates
draw on plant-level data (1979–1999) from the annual industry survey ENIA
(Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual) of the Chilean manufacturing sector
provided by the INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas). Secondly, we use
bilateral trade flows of Chile and its main trade partners at the industry level
(2-digit) to capture export and import barriers. To do so we rely on the border
effect gravity framework developed by Fontagne´ et al. (2005) and use the Trade
and Production database provided by the CEPII (Centre d’Etudes Prospecives
1 See Kraay (2002) on China, Alvarez and Lopez (2005) on Chile, De Loecker (2007) on Slovenia.
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et d’Information Internationales). This strategy enables us to obtain time-varying
measures of trade integration at the industry level. Unlike Chilean tariff rates,
these measures do present heterogeneity across industries. Finally, in the third step
we estimate the impact of import and export barriers on plant productivity by
combining the results of the first two steps. Here we regress plant productivity on
border effect estimates.
The paper yields new findings on trade policy implications. Considering
productivity gains relative to non traded sectors, our results suggest that: (1) a
reduction in export barriers fosters plant productivity in both export-oriented and
import-competing industries; and that (2) the impact of import barriers depends on
trade orientation. In import-competing industries a decrease in import barriers has a
negative effect on plant productivity. We show that this result is related to the
presence of increasing returns to scale (IRS) in these industries. Foreign competition
may have dampened domestic sales and, thereby, reduced the possibility to exploit
scale economies. In the case of export-oriented industries, a fall in import barriers is
associated to plant productivity improvements. This result is present in different
static specifications. Nevertheless, in the dynamic specification, when we control for
past productivity levels, the negative effect of foreign competition also shows up in
export-oriented industries.
Besides the above-mentioned mechanism of scale economies, we test other
channels linking trade integration and productivity. Results here reveal productivity
improvements arising from the access to foreign capital equipment (in both export-
oriented and import-competing industries). Moreover, searching for deeper insights
on the impact of foreign competition, we find that it depends on the distance to the
technology frontier and on whether this competition comes from low-wage or high-
wage countries.
We carried out several robustness checks. The list includes alternative measures
of productivity, different specifications dealing with potential mark-ups bias and
dynamic concerns of the persistence of plant productivity over time. We also run
our three-steps estimation using more disaggregated regressions of production
functions and border effects (at 3-digit instead of 2-digit) and considering an
enlarged sample of trade partners. Furthermore, in the different empirical stages we
deal with the potential risk of reversal causality between trade barriers and plant
productivity. This is done by purging productivity effects in the gravity specifi-
cation, by using a 4-year rolling horizon in step 2 and by treating trade barriers as
endogenous in GMM estimations.
Our findings contribute with new evidence on trade liberalization and plant
productivity in Chile. The identification setting has been chosen to allow for a
close comparison with previous results obtained by Pavcnik (2002) and Bergoeing
et al. (2006).2 Both studies acknowledge the presence of time-varying firm
heterogeneity and deal with the effects of trade integration on productivity gains
in a similar and comparable identification strategy. Using plant-level data, Pavcnik
(2002) estimates the impact of trade on plant productivity in Chile during the
2 Several works have investigated the relationship between Chilean market-oriented reforms and plant
productivity. See also Liu and Tybout (1996), Bergoeing et al. (2002, 2004), Alvarez and Lopez (2005).
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period 1979–1986. By the means of a difference-in-difference framework, Pavcnik
(2002) concludes that trade liberalization induces the growth of within-plant
productivity in import-competing industries. Productivity improvements in export-
oriented industries are observed only for initial years.3 Using our sample, we are
able to reproduce these results. However, contrary to what the difference-in-
difference specification assumes, trade exposure in Chile does not increase
continuously during Pavcnik’s sample period. Indeed, in the context of the 1982
debt crisis, the government rose import tariffs from 15% in 1982 up to 35% in
1985.
Chilean trade reforms have been recently revisited by Bergoeing et al. (2006).
They study the impact of the financial and trade reforms on productivity gains in
Chile during a longer period (1980–2001). The authors show that if one uses
effective tariffs instead of year dummies to capture trade liberalization, plant
productivity advantages in export-oriented industries are not significant and, similar
to our results, productivity gains of plants belonging to import-competing industries
fall after trade liberalization.
Nevertheless, both studies suffer from the lack of cross-section variance on the
right-hand side of regressions. Indeed, the identification of trade liberalization
effects can be problematic since the reduction in import tariffs was homogeneous
across industries and remained almost constant during the 1990s. The radical drop
in the average nominal tariff rate from 98% in 1973 to 10% in 1979 came along with
the homogenization of tariff rates among industries. Even their rise in early 1980s,
during the debt crisis, was uniform. This homogeneous tariff reduction is probably
the reason why Pavcnik (2002) is constrained to use time dummy indicators and
Bergoeing et al. (2006) can not get enough variance for their estimates concerning
export-oriented industries.
Considering direct measures of trade policy such as import tariffs also neglects
two important features of trade integration. First, a unilateral import tariff reduction
does not necessarily imply a symmetric response across trade partners. Second,
several direct and indirect trade barriers might be omitted (Anderson and van
Wincoop 2004). Among them, one finds not only non-tariff barriers (NTBs), but
also bilateral agreements, institutional arrangements, infrastructure and even
political efforts. The picture depicted by the evolution of tariffs in Chile does not
completely reflect the different policy instruments applied by the government in
order to promote exports and imports. For instance, during the eighties the
government established an export promotion program and an economic positioning
campaign to diffuse the country image in external markets. At the beginning of
1990s a Commercial Information System (CIS) was implemented to provide firms
with information about international markets. During that decade, the new
democracy set several free trade agreements (FTAs) with Latin American countries.
This meant further reductions of import tariff and non-tariff barriers and the
improvement of market access for Chilean exporters in manufacturing. Table 14 in
3 Pavcnik (2002) also performs the Olley and Pakes (1996) aggregate productivity decomposition and
shows that, in the period, aggregate productivity growth is mainly explained by the exit of the least
productive firms and the reallocation of market shares towards most productive ones.
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Appendix 2 summarizes the key trade policy instruments implemented by Chile
from 1975 to 2004.
By estimating the evolution of trade integration between Chile and its trading
partners, we are able to capture this type of missing information. This strategy also
allows us to address the lack of cross-section variance of standard trade measures
and to capture the multiple channels of trade integration. These are the main
contributions relative to previous works.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the estimation
strategy of our empirical exercises. Section 3 shows the results and, finally, Sect. 4
presents a brief conclusion.
2 Estimation strategy
The estimation strategy consists of three steps. In the first one, we estimate the
production function using ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed-effect (FE) specifi-
cation and the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology to obtain plant TFP as a
residual. In the second step, we construct the measure of trade liberalization by
estimating border effects between partners following Fontagne´ et al. (2005).
Finally, in the third step, we estimate the impact of trade barriers by regressing
productivity on border effect estimates. Within this methodology, we address
simultaneity issues in the estimation of TFP (step 1) and reversal causality between
productivity and trade flows (step 2 and 3).
2.1 Step 1: production function
We estimate the following specification of a Cobb–Douglas production function at
the 2-digit industry level:
ypt ¼ b0 þ bxxpt þ bkkpt þ ept ð1Þ
where all variables are expressed in natural logs, ypt is the value added of
plant p at time t, which is explained by short-term adjustable inputs xpt (i.e.
skilled and unskilled labour) and capital stock kpt. The error term can be
decomposed into an intrinsical ‘‘transmitted’’ component xpt (productivity shock)
and an i.i.d. component vpt. Consequently, plant TFP apt is calculated as the
residual given by the difference between the observed output and the predicted
factor contribution:
bapt ¼ ypt  bbxxpt  bbkkpt ð2Þ
When estimating production functions using firm panel data, eventual problems
concerning simultaneity and selection should be considered. Simultaneity arises
because input demand and unobserved productivity are positively correlated. Firm-
specific productivity is known by the firm but not by the econometrician. If a firm
expects a high productivity shock it will anticipate an increase in its final good
demand and, consequently, it will purchase more inputs. OLS will tend to provide
upwardly biased estimates of the labour elasticity and downwardly biased estimates
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of the capital one.4 Selection problems are likely to be present because the
unobserved productivity influences the exit decision of the firm and we can only
observe those firms that stay in the market. On the other hand, if capital is positively
correlated with profits, firms with larger capital stock will decide to stay in the
market even for low realizations of productivity shocks. This implies a potential
source of negative correlation in the sample between productivity shocks and capital
stock, which translates into a downward bias in capital elasticity estimates.
Olley and Pakes (1996) (henceforth OP) propose a three-stage methodology to
control for the unobserved firm productivity. They deal explicitly with exit and
investment behaviour. The rationale is to reveal the unobserved productivity
through the investment behaviour of the firm, which in turns depends, theoretically,
on capital and productivity. Selection issues are taken into account by inferring that
firms that stay in the market have decided to do it accordingly to their capital stock
and their expectations of productivity. By the means of this theoretical exit rule, OP
estimate survival probabilities conditional on firm’s available information. These
probabilities are then used in the productivity estimation.
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003; henceforth LP) extend the OP idea, by noting that
some inputs, such as electricity or materials, can be better proxies than investment
to control for the unobserved firm productivity when one deals with simultaneity.
Inputs adjust in a more flexible way, so they are more responsive to productivity
shocks. Moreover, inputs usually have more non-zero observations than investment,
a property that has consequences on estimation efficiency. In the case of the ENIA
survey this property is important. Thus, in order to maximize sample size we keep
the LP strategy and use electricity as a proxy for unobserved productivity.5
There are some advantages of OP-LP methodologies. Firstly, they perform better
than fixed-effect specifications because the unobserved individual effect (produc-
tivity) is not constrained to be constant over time. Secondly, approaches based on
instrumental variables can be limited by the instruments availability. Finally, OP-LP
do not assume restrictions on the parameters. For instance, an alternative approach
is the one developed by Katayama et al. (2009) who show how misleading can be
the use of sale revenues to measure productivity. Factor prices and mark-ups can
produce important distortions if they are not homogeneous. However, their
methodology assumes constant returns to scale and neglect entry-exit process to
facilitate likelihood estimates. Again both assumptions are not neutral in the case of
the ENIA. In the third step, we allow for plant’s individual fixed effects and control
for market concentration at a disaggregated industry level in order to reduce the
potential risk of mark-up bias.
4 OLS elasticities can be stated as b^x ¼ bx þ r^kk r^xer^xk r^ker^xx r^kkr^xk 2 and b^k ¼ bk þ
r^xx r^ker^xk r^xe
r^xx r^kkr^xk 2 : Where r^rs is the
covariance between variables r and s in the sample. If capital is positively correlated with labour and
labour’s correlation with the productivity shock is higher than capital one (which is the realistic case) then
the coefficient of capital b^k will be underestimated and the one of labour b^x upward biased.
5 Besides technical concerns, a key difference between LP and OP is that the former does not directly
take into account selection. However, as LP show, the risk of selection biases are significantly reduced by
considering an unbalanced panel.
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2.2 Step 2: border effects
It is well-known that the reduction of tariffs in Chile was homogeneous across
industries. As a consequence, tariff rates do not provide enough cross-section
variance. On the other hand, tariffs are not the only measure that matters to capture
trade costs. One should also consider bilateral agreements, asymmetries between
export and import costs and indirect difficulties to trade.6 Considering all these
features of trade, we do obtain heterogeneity in both industrial and time dimensions.
To do so, we apply a border effect methodology. This type of empirical strategy
provides an assessment of the level of trade integration by estimating a gravity-like
model that considers, as a very intuitive benchmark, the difficulties encountered by
domestic producers in reaching domestic (intra-border) destinations.7
2.2.1 The methodology
The identification strategy of Fontagne´ et al. (2005) builds on Head and Mayer
(2000) gravity model derivation. This strategy seems suitable to measure Chilean
trade integration as it corrects for the lack of theoretical foundations of earlier works
and keeps the idea of using intra-national trade as a benchmark of trade integration.
Moreover, it allows for asymmetries in the identification of trade barriers among
partners, one of the main focus of this paper. Fontagne´ et al.’s (2005) theoretical
foundation builds on a static monopolistic competition setting with increasing
returns to scale for one-sector economies. Consider an instantaneous constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function in which the representative consumer
of country i has specific preferences aijt
s for each variety h depending on the exporter
country j (for the sake of clarity in the exposition of our empirical implementation,
we indicate explicitly both industry s and time t specificity):
Usit ¼
X
Nst
j¼1
X
Msjt
h¼1
asijtc
s
ijht
 
rt1
rt
2
4
3
5
rt
rt1
ð3Þ
Thus, varieties belonging to the same country share the same weight in the utility
function. Imports mijt
s (= cijt
s pijt
s ) of country i from country j are valuated at the point
of consumption psijt ¼ psjtssijt. This includes the producer price pjts augmented of all
trade cost sijt
s , modeled as iceberg costs. Total expenditure for the industry Ysit ¼
PNst
j0¼1 m
s
ij0t considers all imports, including intra-national ones miit
s . For symmetric
varieties, this utility function (3) with constant elasticity rt leads to the well-known
demands:
6 Theoretically, these indirect difficulties include a large list of country specificities, namely bias of
consumption towards home goods and the like. As long as they can be interpreted, at least in part, as the
outcome of history and political efforts, we consider them as a part of the measure of trade integration.
7 McCallum (1995) applies this methodology to study market access between Canada and the US.
Despite the high expected trade integration, trade between US and Canada is found to be around 22 times
more difficult than Canadian intra-national trade. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) reestimate
McCallum’s (1995) model, correcting for multilateral price bias, and the assessment still remains striking.
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msijt ¼
psjts
s
ijt
asijtP
s
it
 !1rt
MsjtY
s
it ð4Þ
In this gravity-like Eq. 4, Psit ¼
PNt
j0¼1
pij0 t
aij0 t
 1rt
Msj0t
  1
1rt
is the consumer price of
all varieties in the industry. This index takes into account differences in price setting
across countries. If omitted, not only a multilateral control is missing but also a bias
is induced between the error term and the partners dummies (border effect).
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) argue that the omission of multilateral price
effects (what they call ‘‘multilateral resistances’’) explains the upward bias in border
effects of Canada vis-a`-vis the US estimated by McCallum (1995).8
One might mention four possible strategies to consistently estimate a gravity
equation including price effects. The first one is to use price index data. Baier and
Bergstrand (2001) follow this strategy measuring prices with GDP deflators.
However, as highlighted by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), empirical
counterparts of Pit
s such as consumer price index (CPI) measures neglect changes
in the true set of varieties and do not accurately reflect non-tariff barriers and
indirect trade policies. The second strategy is the one followed by Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003). They develop a two-step methodology in which border effect
estimates are used to measure multilateral price effects. Besides practical difficulties
of implementation, one crucial limitation for our purposes is the assumption of
symmetry in bilateral trade costs. A third alternative approach uses fixed-effect
specification to control for unobservable prices. The effect of price indexes is
captured by the coefficients of individual fixed effects related to country source and
destination (Harrigan 1996). Feenstra (2003) shows that the coefficients of fixed-
effect estimation are consistent and reports values very similar to the non-linear
least squares estimation of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Redding and
Venables (2004) construct market access measures to explain cross-country
differences in per capita income. Their market access estimation relies on fixed
country effects to capture exporting and importing country characteristics. These
country indicators take into account unobserved economic variables associated with
supply and market capacity.
If the economic and geographic determinants captured by fixed effects vary over
time, a useful strategy consists in eliminating the price index in the CES demand
setting by expressing inter-national imports relative to intra-national ones. This is
what Head and Mayer (2000) do. We follow this solution and divide Eq. 4 by miit
s :
msijt
msiit
¼ a
s
ijt
asiit
 rt1 psjt
psit
 rt ssijt
ssiit
 1rt vsjt
vsit
 
ð5Þ
where
vsjt
vsit
is the relative value added between countries i and j for the industry s. It
allows to capture the relative number of symmetric varieties within a model of
monopolistic competition. To obtain an empirical counterpart of Eq. 5 we assume,
as Fontagne´ et al. (2005), that trade costs (ssijt) are composed of transport cost
8 See previous footnote
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(captured by distance dij), ad valorem tariffs (tijt
s ) and the ‘‘tariff-equivalent’’ of non-
tariff barriers (NTBijt
s ). That is to say, ssijt  dij
 dt
1 þ tsijt
 
1 þ NTBsijt
 
.
Protection (tariffs and non-tariff barriers) varies across all partner pairs and
depends on the direction of the flow for a given pair. To capture this, we define
1 þ tsijt
 
1 þ NTBsijt
 
 exp Pa
P
b c
s
abtBab
	 

, where Bab is a dummy that equals 1
if country i belongs to region a and country jto region b.
Preferences aijt
s are supposed to have a random component eijt
s and a systematic
domestic bias bit
s for goods produced in the home country i. This home market bias is
reduced when countries i and j share the same language and are contiguous. The
dummies Lij and Cij are defined to capture each situation, respectively. Under these
assumptions preferences can be written as asijt  exp ½esijt  ðbsit  kLtLij
kCtCijÞPaPb Bab, where kLt and kCt represent the extent to which the home
market bias is mitigated by common language and contiguity. Taking into account
all this dummy structure, Eq. 5, can be written as:
ln
msijt
msiit
 
¼ ln v
s
jt
vsit
 
 rt  1ð Þdt ln dij
dii
 
 rt  1ð ÞkLtLij  rt  1ð ÞkCtCij
 rt ln
psjt
psit
 

X
a
X
b
rt  1ð Þ bsit þ csabt
 
Bab
þ rt  1ð Þ esijt  esiit
 
ð6Þ
2.2.2 Empirical specification
The number of observations in our bilateral flow sample does not allow to split the
regressions by each year and 2-digit industry. In order to consistently estimate Eq. 6,
we run pooled regressions in a 4-years rolling window for each industry. This allows
us to obtain time-varying elasticities. Our estimable equation is now given by:
ln
msijt
msiit
 
¼ a1t0 ln
vsjt
vsit
 
þ a2t0 ln dij
dii
 
þ a3t0Lij þ a4t0Cij þ a5t0 ln
psjt
psit
 
þ
X
a
X
b
gsabt0Bab þ ijt
ð7Þ
Where the theoretical counterpart of a1t0 ; a2t0 ; a3t0 ; a4t0 ; a5t0 ; gsabt0
 
is given by Eq.
6. We split the sample by each 2-digit industry and periods t = t0 - 3 to t0, where t0
runs from 1982 to 1999. Hence, gsabt0 will capture the average border effects of
import of a from b (i.e.  rt  1ð Þ bsit þ csabt
 Þ for t 2 t0  3; t0½  . Conversely, the
border effect associated to export from a to b will be given by gsbat0 : As Fontagne´
et al. (2005), we drop the constant and incorporate all dummy variables Bab, whose
estimated coefficients can be directly interpreted as border effects.
In our regressions we consider bilateral trade flows of the main trade partners of
Chile. The list includes the United States (USA), 9 European countries (EU) and 6
Latin American countries (LA). Thus a; b 2 EU; LA; USA; CHLf g: Hence, we obtain
the border effects for each combination of regions, including intra-regional trade in
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the case of the European Union and Latin American partners. For each time period
t0, industry s and flow direction (export or import), our proxies of trade barriers are
aggregated as the weighted average of all border effects estimates in which Chile is
involved. Weights are given by the share of the export or import flow on total export
or import of Chile at time t0.
We run OLS regressions and, due to the form of the error term, use Hubert and
White corrected standard errors clustered at the importer-industry-year level to
control for the expected correlation. In Eq. 7 we do not impose a1t0 ¼ 1 , as the
theoretical Eq. 6 suggests, and allow for its empirical estimation.
Note that a potential endogeneity problem exits in the estimation of Eq. 7. In a
monopolistic competition framework, prices and output are determined simulta-
neously. Fontagne´ et al. (2005) use aggregate prices (instead of industry-level ones).
The underlying assumption is that prices at the national level are less correlated with
profit maximization at the firm level. In our estimation, we adopt a different
approach and use relative wages at the industry level. This choice is motivated by
the potential reverse causality in step 3. As previously mentioned, we will use the
border effect estimates to test the impact of trade liberalization on plant productivity
for different industries. Most productive industries (or those producing high quality
goods) will tend to increase their trade flows and induce a downward bias in the
border effect estimates (step 2). Our assumption is that relative wages capture
potential asymmetries in technology or efficiency and thereby they help to remove
productivity concerns from the border effect estimates.9 Moreover, due to the 4-year
rolling horizon the border effect estimates include past values of trade flows, which
allows for a lagged effect of the change in trade barriers. This also contributes to
reduce the risk of reversal causality in step 3. We go further in the series of
robustness checks of step 3 and treat border effects as endogenous regressors in the
context of generalized method of moments (GMM) and dynamic estimates.
2.3 Step 3: the impact of trade policy on plant TFP
In this final step, we use the previous estimates of trade barriers to measure the
impact of trade liberalization on plant productivity across export-oriented and
import-competing industries relative to non-traded ones. The following reduced
equation is estimated, analogous to the difference-in-difference framework imple-
mented by Pavcnik (2002):
bapt ¼ h0 þ bBst þ fTs0 þ dBst  Ts0 þ uZpt þ npt ð8Þ
where h0 is the constant and npt the error term. bapt is the log of TFP of plant p at
time t estimated by the LP strategy. Bst is a vector of trade barriers estimates (import
and export border effects) for the 2-digit industry (s) in which the plant operates. Ts0
is a vector of trade orientation dummies indicating if the plant belongs to export-
oriented or import-competing industries. Similar to Pavcnik (2002), we classify
9 In non-reported regressions we have used relative aggregate prices and also the lag of relative aggregate
prices and relative wages. The resulting border-effect estimates are very close to those used in what
follows.
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industries by trade orientation (s0) at the 3-digit industry level (see Appendix 1).
Plants are classified as export-oriented if they belong to a 3-digit industry which has
more than 15% of exports over total production and as import-competing if the
industry has more than 15% of imports over total production. The rest are
considered as non-traded.10 Our classification concerns the initial period of 1980–
1986. The initial sample classification also helps to avoid endogeneity problems
arising from the classification. As Pavcnik (2002) notes, classification at 3- or 4-
digit does not change significantly. Neither does it when considering the pre-sample
period.
Zpt is a vector of plant characteristics: industry affiliation at 2-digit
11, indicators
of entry and exit and plant characteristics that may change over time, namely the use
of imported inputs and credit constraints. Similar to Bergoeing et al. (2006), we
identify plants that may face liquidity constraints using as a proxy a loan tax
payment at the plant level. In Chile, financial credits are subject to this tax. Credit is
a dummy variable equal to one if the plant reports having paid this tax in a given
year. This information is used as a signal that the plant has not been financial
constraint. We also introduce year indicators to control for other macroeconomic
shocks. The excluded categories are non-traded industries, the year 1982 and the
industry 38. As a robustness check we use alternative measures of plant productivity
and also control for variable mark-ups.
We are mainly interested in the estimates of the vector coefficient d of the
interaction terms (BstTs0). Negative and significant coefficients mean that a
reduction of trade barriers has a positive effect on productivity in traded industries
(export-oriented and import-competing) relative to non-traded ones. The full set of
interaction terms enables us to measure separately the effect of import and export
barriers, depending on trade orientation.
2.4 Data
In the first step, we use plant-level data from the ENIA survey, which is provided by
the Chilean institute of statistics INE. This survey is a manufacturing census of
Chilean plants with more than 10 employees. Our data covers the period 1979–1999
and contains information of added value, materials, labour, investment and exports
(only available from 1990).12 We used different specific deflators at the 3-digit level
(ISIC Rev-2) and year base 1992 for added value, exports, materials and investment.
For the latter, specific deflators are considered for infrastructure, vehicles and
machinery. Capital series were constructed using the methodology of Bergoeing
10 There are only two industries (351 and 384) that matched up to both categories. Nevertheless, the
industry 351 (384) presents an export-output ratio of 0.82 (0.21) and an import-output ratio of 1.32 (2.01).
Therefore these industries were classified as import competing. Our results remain unchanged if we
consider a fourth category of export-import competing for industries 351 and 384.
11 We introduce industry indicators to control for specific characteristics of industries. In order to avoid
possible colinearity issues, following Pavcnik (2002), the industry affiliation dummies are defined at the
2-digit industry level, while trade orientation dummies are defined at the 3-digit industry level.
12 The ENIA survey has been used in previous studies such as Pavcnik (2002), Liu and Tybout (1996),
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Bergoeing et al. (2006) for different sample periods.
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et al. (2006).13 Table 7 in Appendix 2 shows a description of the variables and
Table 8 in Appendix 2 reports general descriptive statistics of the plant-level
sample.
In the second step we use data from the Trade and Production Database
constructed by CEPII. This is an extension of the data collected by Nicita and
Olarreaga (2001) at the World Bank. The CEPII has filled many missing values for
production variables using UNIDO and OECD-STAN (for OECD members). It has
also completed trade data with the international trade database BACI of CEPII. The
final bilateral trade data covers the period 1976–1999 for 67 developing and
developed countries. It provides information on value added, export and import
trade flows, origin and destination countries, wages and labour at the 3-digit
industry level (ISIC Rev-2).
Detailed intra-national trade flows for our sample of countries are not available.
Intra-national trade is computed as output minus exports. This requires an
appropriate measure of internal distance that should take into account economic
activity to weight internal regions (Head and Mayer 2000). For distance variables,
contiguity and common language, we also used the CEPII database of internal and
external distances. The CEPII uses specific city-level data in order to compute a
matrix of distance including the geographic population density for each country.
Distance between two countries is measured based on bilateral distance between
cities weighted by the share of the city in the overall country’s population.
In the regressions we use bilateral trade data for the main trading partners of Chile:
nine members of the European Union throughout the whole period 1979–1999
(Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, the
Netherlands and Denmark), the United States and seven Latin-American countries
(Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela). In the
robustness checks we use a significantly enlarged sample including 177 countries.
3 Results
3.1 Results of step 1: plant TFP estimates
In this step we estimate the Cobb–Douglas production function in Eq. 1 at the 2-
digit industry level using OLS, fixed effects and the LP methodology. Table 1
shows the results. As expected, LP estimates of unskilled labour elasticities are
generally the lowest and those of capital elasticities the highest. This means that the
bias induced by the larger responsiveness of unskilled labour relative to capital is
addressed. Considering the production function estimates by LP, we can not reject at
5% the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale in the Wald test in five export-
oriented industries [Food (31); Wood (33); Non-metallic minerals (36) and Basic
metals (37)]. On the other hand, industries with increasing returns are mainly
import-competing [Textile (32), Paper (34), Chemicals (35) and Machinery(38)].
Thus, in these industries market size can affect the cost structure of firms.
13 We thank the authors for providing us with their Stata routine for capital series.
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After estimating production function elasticities, we calculate plant TFP as a
residual. Figure 1 presents the average evolution of different measures of plant
productivity: fixed effects (tfp_fe), LP (tfp_lp), OLS (tfp_ols) and labour
productivity (ln productivity).
As a first robustness check of our productivity measures, the figure shows that
labour productivity and all TFP measures depict similar evolutions. Although FE
and LP elasticities exhibit some differences, the TFP path illustrated by both
measures is very similar.14
Table 1 Production function estimates
Industry Factorsa OLS SE Fixed effects SE LPb SE
Food and beverage (31) U 0.815 (0.010) 0.627 (0.012) 0.570 (0.024)
S 0.359 (0.009) 0.159 (0.008) 0.212 (0.015)
Obs: 18559 K 0.250 (0.005) 0.083 (0.007) 0.208 (0.046)
Textile (32) U 0.833 (0.011) 0.777 (0.014) 0.710 (0.024)
S 0.202 (0.010) 0.165 (0.009) 0.174 (0.018)
Obs: 11063 K 0.206 (0.005) 0.102 (0.008) 0.249 (0.034)
Wood (33) U 0.865 (0.017) 0.849 (0.021) 0.681 (0.034)
S 0.208 (0.015) 0.095 (0.014) 0.131 (0.021)
Obs: 5711 K 0.209 (0.009) 0.104 (0.013) 0.275 (0.040)
Paper (34) U 0.763 (0.018) 0.539 (0.024) 0.692 (0.044)
S 0.252 (0.014) 0.175 (0.015) 0.207 (0.025)
Obs: 3175 K 0.229 (0.010) 0.182 (0.014) 0.299 (0.055)
Chemicals (35) U 0.604 (0.016) 0.639 (0.017) 0.528 (0.045)
S 0.337 (0.015) 0.168 (0.013) 0.266 (0.028)
Obs: 6588 K 0.294 (0.008) 0.149 (0.011) 0.354 (0.057)
Non metalic products (36) U 0.780 (0.028) 0.797 (0.031) 0.577 (0.074)
S 0.241 (0.026) 0.130 (0.025) 0.103 (0.049)
Obs: 2153 K 0.244 (0.013) 0.136 (0.018) 0.281 (0.074)
Basic metals (37) U 0.280 (0.070) 0.346 (0.061) 0.217 (0.104)
S 0.485 (0.063) 0.161 (0.045) 0.263 (0.094)
Obs: 640 K 0.412 (0.042) 0.059 (0.049) 0.290 (0.189)
Machinery (38) U 0.897 (0.012) 0.766 (0.015) 0.767 (0.033)
S 0.242 (0.011) 0.204 (0.011) 0.178 (0.022)
Obs: 8524 K 0.164 (0.006) 0.111 (0.010) 0.236 (0.058)
Standard errors (SE) in parentheses
a U unskilled labour (production workers), S skilled labour (non-production workers), K capital stock
b Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology using electricity to control for the unobserved plant het-
erogeneity. 250 replications are used for bootstrap. The Wald test of constant returns to scale is rejected
for Textile (32), Paper (34), Chemicals (35) and Machinery (38) industries
14 Thus, even if the assumption of fixed effects may overestimate the capital elasticity and underestimate
labour one, after computing all factors contribution, the evolution of the residual is not drastically
affected.
Trade integration and within-plant productivity evolution in Chile 125
123
3.2 Results of step 2: border effect estimates
In the second step, we construct market access measures by estimating Eq. 7 at the
2-digit industry level. This estimation captures the heterogeneity of trade barriers
across industries. Figure 2 plots the weighted average of export and import border
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effect estimates across trade partners. Weights are based on each country export
(import) share over total exports (imports) of Chile. All coefficients are significant
at least at 5%. The solid line depicts export border effects and the dashed line those
corresponding to import.
Difficulties of Chilean exporters to access foreign markets (export border effect)
were relatively constant at the beginning of the eighties. Reflecting the active trade
agreement agenda, most industries switch to a downward trend at the end of the
1980s. This becomes specially pronounced during the 1990s. This is the case of
Wood, Textiles, Plastics and Machinery. Two important export-oriented industries,
Basic metals and Food, show an evolution of export border effect almost flat. The
former, however, is the most traditional export-oriented industry and in this industry
trade barriers were already low at the beginning of the period. On the other hand, the
rather flat evolution of export barriers on Food industry might be explained by
quality controls set by EU and the US. Home biases are also likely to be present in
this type of industry. Once again one observes the extent to which direct trade
measures such as import tariffs do not capture all dimensions of trade integration:
export barriers have considerably diminished in all industries during the 1990s, even
if import tariffs were already low.
Figure 2 also shows the evolution of the weighted measure of industry-level
barriers faced by EU, LA and the US to access the Chilean market (import border
effect). In many industries, import barriers increased during the first half of the
1980s (Food, Textiles, Wood, Non-metallics and Machinery). This is consistent
with the raise in import tariffs during this period and also with other discretionary
policy measures set to control the current account deficit during the debt crisis.
Since we use a moving average of border effects, this tendency is observed even in
the late 1980s as a lagged effect of protection. During the 1990s import border
effects fall in almost all industries except in Basic metals. This reduction and
convergence of import border effects seem also consistent with the new trade
integration agenda of Chile based on bilateral and multilateral trade agreements.
3.3 Results of step 3: the impact of trade barriers on plant TFP
The final step consists in identifying the influence of each type of trade barrier on
the evolution of plant productivity. Equation 8 disentangles the variation in
productivity due to changes in trade barriers depending on trade orientation. We are
interested in the vector coefficient d of the interaction terms between trade
orientation indicators and our border effect estimates.
3.3.1 Reproducing Pavcnik’s (2002) results
In order to provide a baseline estimation, we start by reproducing Pavcnik’s (2002)
regressions for our full sample period. We use within group estimates in a
difference-in-difference framework. In this specification, year indicators capture
trade liberalization effects. These estimates are illustrated in Fig. 3. We obtain
similar results to Pavcnik (2002). Once controlling for exit and plant-specific
characteristics, trade liberalization (captured by time dummies) has a positive
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impact on plant productivity in traded industries (export-oriented and import-
competing) relative to non-traded ones. Considering only the period 1980–1986,
Pavcnik (2002) also highlights that plant productivity gains in export-oriented
industries are minor. Using the full sample period, this trend changes after the
1990s.
3.3.2 Disentangling the effects of export and import barriers
In this section, we employ the weighted average border effects estimated in step 2.
As previously mentioned, we use a 4-year rolling window for each industry. Hence,
the border effect measures capture not only the current but also the lagged effect of
trade integration on plant TFP. This implies the loss of initial years in the sample
(1979–1981). On the other hand, these lagged measures of border effects and the
controls introduced in step 2 to address asymmetric technologies reduce the risk of
potential endogeneity between our measure of trade barriers and productivity.
Additionally, in robustness check of dynamic specification we treat border effects as
endogenous regressors in GMM estimations.
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Table 2 reports the results using the plant TFP measured by the LP methodology
(TFP_LP). After controlling for industry-specific effects (2-digit industry indicators)
and macroeconomic shocks (year indicators), the coefficients of the other variables
should only capture the effects of within-industry productivity variation. We
consider plant-fixed effects and use Huber–White standard errors in all estimations.
In the last column, these errors are corrected for clustering at the plant level.
The first column presents the baseline estimation. In this specification we include
the indicators for export-oriented (Export) and import-competing (Import) indus-
tries, the measures of import border effects (BM) and export border effects (BX) and
their interactions (Export 9 BX, Import 9 BX, Export 9 BM, Import 9 BM). In
this difference-in-difference framework we interpret the coefficients of interaction
Table 2 The impact of trade barriers on plant TFP (LP measure)
1 2 3 4 5 6a
Export 0.636
(0.078)***
0.633
(0.078)***
0.633
(0.078)***
0.638
(0.078)***
0.635
(0.078)***
0.635
(0.111)***
Import 0.283
(0.065)***
0.290
(0.065)***
0.291
(0.065)***
0.288
(0.065)***
0.291
(0.065)***
0.291
(0.090)***
Export 9 BX -0.023
(0.007)***
-0.024
(0.007)***
-0.023
(0.007)***
-0.025
(0.007)***
-0.025
(0.007)***
-0.025
(0.011)**
Import 9 BX -0.063
(0.007)***
-0.062
(0.007)***
-0.062
(0.007)***
-0.062
(0.007)***
-0.062
(0.007)***
-0.062
(0.010)***
Export 9 BM -0.103
(0.011)***
-0.101
(0.011)***
-0.101
(0.011)***
-0.101
(0.011)***
-0.100
(0.011)***
-0.100
(0.015)***
Import 9 BM 0.040
(0.012)***
0.038
(0.012)***
0.038
(0.012)***
0.039
(0.012)***
0.039
(0.012)***
0.039
(0.016)**
BX 0.095
(0.007)***
0.095
(0.007)***
0.095
(0.007)***
0.095
(0.007)***
0.095
(0.007)***
0.095
(0.011)***
BM 0.083
(0.011)***
0.083
(0.011)***
0.083
(0.011)***
0.081
(0.011)***
0.081
(0.011)***
0.081
(0.014)***
Exit indicator -0.134
(0.013)***
-0.139
(0.013)***
-0.137
(0.013)***
-0.137
(0.013)***
-0.137
(0.013)***
Entry indicator -0.063
(0.016)***
-0.063
(0.016)***
-0.063
(0.016)***
-0.063
(0.016)***
Imported inputs 0.051
(0.010)***
0.050
(0.010)***
0.050
(0.012)***
Credit 0.024
(0.009)***
0.024
(0.011)**
Constant 5.284
(0.107)***
5.275
(0.108)***
5.280
(0.107)***
5.259
(0.107)***
5.249
(0.107)***
5.249
(0.136)***
Plant, ISIC 2 and
year ind
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs 46894 46894 46894 46894 46894 46894
Adjusted R2 0.220 0.228 0.229 0.238 0.241 0.241
Huber–White standard errors in parentheses
a Standard errors corrected for clustering at the plant level
*, **, *** denote significance at the level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively
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terms relative to non-traded industries (the omitted category). Export border effects
interacted with both export-oriented (Export 9 BX) and import-competing
(Import 9 BX) indicators present a negative and significant coefficient. This
suggest a positive and significant impact of export barrier reductions on plant
productivity in both traded industries. This result can be related to learning-by-
exporting and international knowledge spillovers (Kraay (2002) on China, Alvarez
and Lopez (2005) on Chile and De Loecker (2007) on Slovenia). In the case of
plants belonging to import-competing industries, the positive effect of export barrier
reductions on their productivity could be driven by new-exporters within these
industries. Bergoeing et al. (2005) show that, even if with a small aggregate export
share, a number of plants entered the export market during the nineties in those
Chilean industries.
The impact of import barriers depends on trade orientation. We find evidence of a
negative effect of import barrier reductions on productivity of plants belonging to
import-competing industries (Import 9 BM). Therefore, contrary to Pavcnik’s
(2002) results, in our regressions foreign competition appears to dampen plant
productivity in those industries. The production function estimates (step 1) show
that import-competing industries (Textile, Paper, Chemicals and Machinery)
operate under increasing returns to scale (IRS). In this case, import competition
reduces market shares of domestic firms shrinking the opportunities to exploit scale
economies. This possible explanation has also been emphasized by Bergoeing et al.
(2006) for different production function estimates and data treatment.
On the other hand, the reduction of import barriers has a positive impact on plant
productivity in export-oriented industries (Export 9 BM). While import competi-
tion does not affect export sales, exporters also sell in the domestic markets and
have to face foreign competitors. Hence, this category of exporters may help to
isolate the ‘‘trimming fat’’ effect of foreign competition, since economies of scale
are guaranteed for these firms by the access to international markets. The positive
effect of the reduction of import barriers on plant productivity in export-oriented
industries, in these static regressions, might come from innovative strategies
implemented to improve domestic competitiveness. However, if one might expect a
positive and a negative effect of foreign competition, for plants belonging to import-
competing industries the effect of market size reduction is negative enough to offset
a positive outcome of import barrier reductions.
The above results (interaction terms) remain almost unchanged after the
progressive inclusion of several controls.15 As expected, the exit indicator (Exit
ind) has a negative coefficient (column 2). Exiting plants are on average 14% less
productive than surviving plants. The entry indicator (Entry ind) coefficient is also
negative showing that new-entrants are roughly 6% less productive than incumbents
(column 3). The use of imported inputs (Imported input) also appears to be
positively correlated with productivity (column 4). The last column introduces a
financial indicator (Credit). Although the coefficient is small, it has the expected
15 It is well documented in plant-level studies that multinationals are relatively productive, technology-
intensive, and trade-intensive. Unfortunately, in our database, plant foreign status is only available since
1993.
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positive sign (column 5). Column 6 reports the results correcting for clustering at
the plant level. Our estimates are still significant if one controls for intra group
correlation.
3.3.3 Robustness checks
Alternative measures of productivity gains The previous results remain robust using
alternative measures of plant productivity. First, we use the estimates of the
production function using an individual fixed-effect specification (within-group
estimates) instead of LP strategy to obtain the plant TFP in step 1. The first two
columns of Table 3 report the results using this alternative measure of TFP
(TFP_FE). Columns 3 and 4 show the results using labour productivity (Labour pr),
measured as (deflated) value added per worker, and controlling for capital intensity
(deflated capital stock over total labour). In both cases, the sign and the magnitude
of the coefficients of the interaction terms between trade barriers and trade
orientation indicators are very similar to those obtained in the previous specification
(Table 2). Export barrier reductions improve plant productivity of firms in export-
oriented and import-competing industries, while the fall in import barriers has only
a positive impact on export-oriented industries and a negative effect on import-
competing ones. These findings confirm the previous results using plant TFP
estimated by the LP strategy.
Enlarged country sample and 3-digit industry level intermediate estimates So far,
we have estimated border effects at the 2-digit industry level and for the most
representative trade partners of Chile for the manufacturing sector: the US, Latin
America and Europe.16 As a robustness check, we compute border effects by
estimating Eq. 7 at 3-digit (instead of 2-digit) over a significantly enlarged sample,
including almost all countries of in the available information (177 countries).17 We
follow Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and estimate the gravity model in its
multiplicative form. The aim is to take into account the risk of bias due to
heteroskedasticity and zero flows, which is significantly more prominent in this new
sample. We use Zero Inflated Poisson (ZIP) to allow for a particular regime
asociated to zero flows (see Greene 2008). Table 9 in Appendix 2 depicts the
correlation between the previous estimates of border effects at 2-digit industry level
and the ones estimated at 3-digit.
We also estimate the production function at 3-digit industry level in order to
allow for further industry heterogeneity in technologies. Table 10 in Appendix 2
shows the average TFP of each desegregated industry at 3-digit. We then carry out
the same baseline regressions using these more disaggregated estimates of border
16 Exports to these countries represent 85% of total Chilean exports, while Chilean manufactured imports
from these countries represent almost 80% of total imports in the nineties (ECLAC). During the nineties,
manufactured exports to Asia represent only 3% of total Chilean exports, while imports from this
continent represent 7%.
17 We include all countries from the ‘‘Trade and Production’’ database except by African countries. The
average trade flow between Africa and Chile is seven times lower than the average trade flow between
Chile and the rest of the world. Even in the 75 percentile trade flow between Africa and Chile we find zero
trade flows.
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effects and TFP. Table 11 in Appendix 2 reports the results. The first column shows
the regression using the TFP at 2-digit industry level and the second and third
columns report the results considering the TFP based on production function
estimates at the 3-digit. Our main results remain robust to all these alternative
specifications. The coefficient of the interaction term between trade orientation and
export border effects are negative, which suggests a positive link between export
promotion and firm productivity. In the case of export oriented industries, however,
the coefficient is only significant at 10% for the estimations using the TFP at 3-digit
industry level (column 2). Concerning import border effects, results depend on the
trade orientation of the industry. Confirming our previous finding, firm productivity
in import competing industries is positively correlated with protection. On the other
hand, the effect of import border effects on firms belonging to export oriented
industries fails this time to show up at conventional levels of significance. For the
sake of comparison, column 3 reports the regressions using the border effect
estimated at 2-digit industry level and the TFP at 3-digit industry level. Here, results
are quite closer to those obtained in the previous regressions of Table 2.18
Industry concentration and mark-ups As is common to the empirical literature on
plant TFP estimations, this productivity measure is likely to be sensitive to mark-
ups variations. It is difficult to disentangle real (physical) productivity improve-
ments from variations in value added arising from market power and price setting.
In order to control for mark-up concerns, which are not captured by the individual
fixed effects included in our previous regressions, we add the Herfindahl index of
market concentration. This index is computed as the sum of the squared market
shares in each 3-digit industry. Column 5 of Table 3 shows these results. Once we
introduce the Herfindahl index the magnitude of the coefficients of the interaction
terms between trade barriers and trade orientation remain entirely unchanged (see
column 6 of Table 2). Market concentration is negatively correlated with plant
productivity in these regressions.
If productivity improvements due to trade barrier reductions reflect variations in
market power, this effect should be more important for firms producing in
concentrated industries. Similar to previous works (Amiti and Konings 2007) we
compute an additional robustness check introducing an interaction term between an
industry concentration indicator, trade barriers and trade orientation indicators
(Export 9 BX 9 concentration, Import 9 BX 9 concentration, Export 9 BM 9
concentration, Import 9 BM 9 concentration). The industry concentration dummy
indicator is equal to one if the average of the Herfindahl index in the pre-sample
period (1979–1981) is higher than 0.22, which corresponds to the 75th percentile.19
The interaction terms of this concentration indicator with trade barriers and trade
orientation indicators are not significant (column 6 of Table 3). This suggests that
18 It should be stressed that our preferred measures of border effects are those used in the previous
regressions (at 2-digit). The reason is that (1) the disaggregation of the analysis and (2) the inclusion of an
enormous quantity of flows with little link to the Chilean economy leads to less plausible gravity
estimates. Moreover, the use of a pseudo maximum likelihood methods relies on a certain type of
heteroskedasticity that not necessarily matches the one implied in relative flows.
19 We use the pre-sample period due to the difference-in-difference framework and also in order to avoid
endogenous changes in the Herfindahl index.
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there is no significant difference in productivity gains between low and high
concentrated industries. Moreover, the coefficients of our key interaction terms
between trade barriers and trade orientation indicators are not altered by the
introduction of these controls.
Dynamic specification In this section, we perform a dynamic specification of Eq.
8 in which plant productivity depends on its past values. This implies the following
auto-regressive multivariate model:
bapt ¼ h0 þ h1bapt1 þ fBst þ cTs þ dBst  Ts0 þ uZpt þ npt ð9Þ
If we believe that the error term contains a specific time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity (npt ¼ tp þ lpt), the lagged value of TFP, bapt1 , is then endogenous
to the error term (as it also contains tp). Econometric literature provides well-known
strategies for this dynamic issue. These strategies exploit moment conditions of
exogeneity of the lags of the endogenous dependent variable. Here we use the GMM
estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991). We include OLS and within-group (WG)
estimators to identify an interval within which a consistent estimate of the
autoregressive coefficient h1 should lie (Bond 2002). The first column of Table 4
reports the OLS results, the second one the within-group estimates and finally,
column 3 shows the GMM results. As expected, the coefficient of the auto-
regressive term (tfp_lp(t-1)) is higher when using OLS than in the case of within-
group regressions. This is a signal of a consistent dynamic specification, which
means that the number of TFP lags on the right-hand side is correct. The set of
instruments used in GMM estimation is composed of deep lags of border effect
measures and TFP. Both set of variables are treated as endogenous. This provides an
additional robustness check on the potential endogeneity issue between border
effects and productivity mentioned in the step 2. The Hansen and Sargan tests
validate our instrument choice. The number of individuals relative to the number of
instruments is reassuring as regards any possible bias in the test when using a large
number of instruments (Windmeijer 2005). We focus on GMM and within-group
results. Dynamic regressions confirm the existence of plant productivity improve-
ments after a reduction of export barriers in both traded industries. The positive sign
in the interaction between import barriers and the import-competing indicator
(Import 9 BM), also resists the dynamic control in GMM regressions. In the case of
a within-group estimates this effect fails to be significant, though the autoregressive
coefficient seems clearly downward biased.
On the contrary, the positive impact of import barrier reductions on plant
productivity in export-oriented industries depends on the method. Within-group
estimations confirm this finding (column 2), while in GMM regressions (column 3)
the coefficient of the interaction between import barriers and the export-oriented
indicator (Export 9 BM) becomes positive and significant. If GMM addresses the
dynamic panel bias as it is expected, this result means that, once we control for the
persistence of plant productivity series, foreign competition might also dampen
domestic sales and plant productivity in export-oriented industries. Their high
productivity trend overwhelms this effect in a static specification or in the case of a
panel data bias in the within-group estimation.
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3.3.4 Trade liberalization channels
Increasing returns to scale One of the novel findings in previous regressions is the
negative impact of import barrier reductions on productivity gains of firms
producing in import-competing industries. This result is robust to alternative
measures of productivity and to controls of market power. In this subsection we
provide additional evidence on the mechanism by which import competition might
affect plant productivity.
Table 4 Dynamic specification
1 2a 3b
TFP(t-1) 0.822 (0.005)*** 0.482 (0.009)*** 0.741 (0.091)***
Export 0.233 (0.044)*** 0.400 (0.101)*** -1.853 (2.221)
Import 0.021 (0.037) 0.137 (0.081)* -1.061 (1.731)
Export 9 BX -0.016 (0.006)*** -0.020 (0.008)** -0.233 (0.067)***
Import 9 BX -0.016 (0.005)*** -0.034 (0.008)*** -0.343 (0.110)***
Export 9 BM -0.030 (0.008)*** -0.052 (0.012)*** 0.358 (0.098)***
Import 9 BM 0.015 (0.008)* 0.019 (0.013) 0.515 (0.154)***
BX 0.043 (0.006)*** 0.066 (0.008)*** 0.220 (0.086)**
BM -0.009 (0.008) 0.030 (0.011)*** -0.346 (0.113)***
Herfindahl -0.008 (0.065) 0.099 (0.109) 0.593 (0.811)
Exit indicator -0.148 (0.012)*** -0.115 (0.014)*** -0.262 (0.039)***
Entry indicator 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Credit 0.041 (0.006)*** 0.013 (0.009) 0.604 (0.266)**
Imported inputs 0.081 (0.006)*** 0.035 (0.010)*** 0.077 (0.137)
Constant 0.722 (0.049)*** 2.672 (0.134)***
Plant, ISIC 2 and year ind Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs 35117 35117 31853
Adjusted R2 0.757 0.287
Sargan p 0.160
Hansen p 0.248
AR(2)p 0.002c
AR(3)p 0.810
Instruments 85
Individuals 5392 4911
Huber–White standard errors in parentheses
a Standard errors corrected for clustering at the plant level
b The set of instruments is composed of lagged values of border effect and plant TFP. Both are treated as
endogenous variables. As usual, we use industry and year indicators as exogenous instruments.
Orthogonal transformations are used to maximize sample size
c Since the Arellano–Bond test of autocorrelation reveals that the disturbance might be in itself auto-
correlated of order-1, but not further, we take lags between t-4 and t-6
*, **, *** denote significance at the level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively
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As previously mentioned, the production function estimates in the first step
reveal IRS in industries classified as import-competing. Hence, one possible
explanation is that foreign competition reduces market shares of all firms and
hampers the possibility to exploit economies of scale in import-competing
industries. To illustrate this argument we provide regressions interacting trade
barriers and a dummy indicating whether the plant operates in an industry under IRS
(Increasing).20
Table 5 presents these results. Firms producing in industries operating under IRS
have a lower productivity level than other firms (column 1). The interaction term
between import barriers and the indicator of increasing returns to scale is positive
and significant (column 2). This means that firms producing in industries under IRS
suffer from foreign competition. As expected, the interaction term between export
barriers and the indicator of increasing returns to scale is negative and significant.
The reduction of export barriers increases market potential and enlarges the
possibility to dynamically exploit scale economies (column 2). These results remain
robust when we control for market concentration (column 3) and standard errors
corrected for clustering at the plant level (column 4).
The better access to foreign technology In a developing country like Chile, the
access to new technologies embodied in high-quality imported inputs and capital
equipment may have a major role on productivity enhancements. This channel is
present in our data. First, in previous regressions we found that firms producing with
imported inputs have a higher TFP than those that only use domestic inputs. Second,
Table 5 Foreign competition and increasing returns to scale
1 2 3 4a
Increasing -0.505 (0.211)** -0.953 (0.216)*** -0.949 (0.216)*** -0.949 (0.243)***
BX 0.060 (0.006)*** 0.083 (0.007)*** 0.083 (0.007)*** 0.083 (0.011)***
BM 0.040 (0.008)*** -0.005 (0.009) -0.006 (0.009) -0.006 (0.011)
Exit indicator -0.140 (0.013)*** -0.136 (0.013)*** -0.136 (0.013)*** -0.136 (0.013)***
Entry indicator -0.061 (0.016)*** -0.062 (0.016)*** -0.062 (0.016)*** -0.062 (0.016)***
Imported inputs 0.047 (0.010)*** 0.049 (0.010)*** 0.049 (0.010)*** 0.049 (0.012)***
Credit 0.028 (0.009)*** 0.025 (0.009)*** 0.025 (0.009)*** 0.025 (0.011)**
Increasing 9 BM 0.125 (0.010)*** 0.124 (0.010)*** 0.124 (0.013)***
Increasing 9 BX -0.030 (0.006)*** -0.030 (0.006)*** -0.030 (0.009)***
Herfindahl -0.226 (0.097)** -0.226 (0.125)*
Constant 6.245 (0.147)*** 6.387 (0.151)*** 6.401 (0.151)*** 6.401 (0.173)***
Plant, ISIC 2 and year ind Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs 46894 46894 46894 46894
Adjusted R2 0.232 0.233 0.232 0.232
Huber–White standard errors in parentheses
a Standard errors corrected for clustering at the plant level
*, **, *** denote significance at the level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively
20 The production function estimates show that industries operating under Increasing returns are Textile
(32), Paper (34), Chemicals (35) and Machinery (38).
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in this subsection instead of using the import border effect at the 2-digit industry
level for each industry, we only use the one corresponding to Machinery (BK_M) as
a proxy of import barriers on capital equipment. The interaction term of this specific
import border effect with the trade orientation dummies captures the extent to which
plant productivity reacts to a better access to foreign capital goods. Table 6 reports
the results of these regressions. Relative to non-traded industries, firms belonging to
traded industries enhance their productivity after a reduction of import barriers on
machinery industry. Moreover, productivity gains are significantly higher for plants
in export-oriented industries (Export 9 BK_M) than in import-competing ones
(Import 9 BK_M).
Foreign competition from low-wage countries The impact of foreign competition
on plant productivity might be different depending on the characteristics of the
exporting country. Responses of firms to changes in competition may differ across
industries depending on exposure to competition from low-wage countries relative
Table 6 Import barriers on machinery and productivity (TFP LP)
1 2 3 4 5 6a
Export 0.950
(0.075)***
0.950
(0.075)***
0.929
(0.075)***
0.928
(0.075)***
0.925
(0.075)***
0.925
(0.108)***
Import 0.482
(0.069)***
0.491
(0.069)***
0.504
(0.069)***
0.502
(0.069)***
0.505
(0.069)***
0.505
(0.095)***
Export 9 BK_M -0.264
(0.013)***
-0.263
(0.013)***
-0.259
(0.013)***
-0.259
(0.013)***
-0.259
(0.013)***
-0.259
(0.020)***
Import 9 BK_M -0.105
(0.014)***
-0.107
(0.014)***
-0.105
(0.014)***
-0.104
(0.014)***
-0.104
(0.014)***
-0.104
(0.020)***
BK_M -0.103
(0.017)***
-0.143
(0.017)***
-0.147
(0.017)***
-0.149
(0.017)***
-0.149
(0.017)***
-0.149
(0.022)***
Exit indicator -0.141
(0.013)***
-0.140
(0.013)***
-0.139
(0.013)***
-0.138
(0.013)***
-0.138
(0.013)***
Entry indicator -0.059
(0.016)***
-0.059
(0.016)***
-0.060
(0.016)***
-0.059
(0.016)***
-0.059
(0.016)***
Herfindahl -0.250
(0.100)**
-0.251
(0.100)**
-0.252
(0.100)**
-0.252
(0.127)**
Imported inputs 0.05
(0.010)***
0.050
(0.010)***
0.050
(0.012)***
Credit 0.024
(0.009)***
0.024
(0.011)**
Constant 6.593
(0.114)***
6.740
(0.114)***
6.749
(0.114)***
6.729
(0.113)***
6.720
(0.113)***
6.720
(0.137)***
Plant, ISIC 2 and
year ind
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs 46894 46894 46894 46894 46894 46894
Adjusted R2 0.116 0.120 0.120 0.121 0.121 0.121
Huber–White standard errors in parentheses
a Standard errors corrected for clustering at the plant level
*, **, *** denote significance at the level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively
Trade integration and within-plant productivity evolution in Chile 137
123
to high-wage countries. Using import penetration ratios, Bernard et al. (2006) find
that US plant survival and employment growth are negatively associated to foreign
competition from low-wage countries.21
In this subsection, we construct proxies of foreign competition from low-wage
and high-wage countries by computing the weighted average of import border effect
estimates for Latin American and Asian countries (low-wage countries), on the one
hand, and for the US and EU (high-wage countries), on the other hand. Then we
regress plant TFP on import border effect of low-wage countries (BM_lw) and on
import border effect of high-wage countries (BM_hw). Table 12 in Appendix 2
shows the results. The impact of foreign competition on plant TFP depends on the
origin of country. Plant TFP is negatively associated with foreign competition from
low-wage country imports (column 1 and 2). However, we find plant TFP
improvements after exposure to high-wage countries (column 1 and 2). In order to
study whether these results are driven by the increasing returns to scale channel, we
introduce an interaction term between the import border effect of low-wage (high-
wage) countries and the indicator of IRS (column 3). We find that the interaction
term between import border effect of high-wage countries and the indicator of IRS
is negative and significant, whereas the interaction term with import barriers from
low-wage countries is positive and significant. Since Chile is a middle-income
developing country, Chileans plants might benefit from positive technological
spillovers from high-wage countries, while foreign competition from low-wage
countries might affect negatively plant TFP due to the increasing returns to scale
channel previously analyzed.
Distance to the frontier As claimed by Aghion et al. (2009) the response of firms’
performance to changes in competition may differ across industries depending on
distance to the technology frontier. In this subsection we test this channel by
analyzing the impact of import barriers on plant TFP in interaction with the
proximity to the technology frontier. The latter is measured as the ratio of the
productivity of each plant relative to that of the most productive firm in the
industry.22 Table 13 in Appendix 2 presents the results. We include several
specifications: (a) border effects and proximity to the frontier at 2-digit in column 1;
(b) the same model with an AR(1) of TFP in column 2; (c) the regressors (border
effects and proximity) in lags in columns 3 and 4 in order to avoid, at least partially,
reversal causality caveats, and (d) the proximity to the frontier and border effects at
3-digit in columns 5 and 6 under contemporaneous and lagged specifications,
respectively. The bottom part of the table shows the marginal effect of foreign
competition (measured by the import border effects) at different values of the
closeness to the frontier. It starts at the minimum (i.e., maximal distance) and
increases gradually towards the maximum value (i.e., when firms are at the frontier).
While a differentiated effect appears it is more controversial than the one claimed
by Aghion et al. (2009). In most of regressions what appears is indeed a positive
effect of protection at the leading edge, excepting columns 5 and 6 in which the
negative effect of protection is only significant for the very maximum level of
21 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out this possible channel.
22 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this possible channel.
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productivity (i.e., when only the most productive firm is concerned). Whether this is
a consequence of the fact that Chile might be itself far from the world technology
frontier or a finding that casts doubt on the commonly accepted distance-to-frontier
argument it is a matter of further research. In any case, it is worth noting that the
empirical literature does not provide clear-cut results on the effect of competition on
economic performance.23
4 Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper is to construct specific measures of trade
barriers at the industry level in order to disentangle the impact of the reduction of
export and import barriers on plant productivity. This distinction introduces new
results. First, the reduction of export barriers improves productivity of plants
belonging to both traded industries. As the export costs fall, more firms are able to
export, increasing their size and probably benefiting from knowledge spillovers
stemming from international markets. This encouraging result is robust to all
robustness checks and specifications. Second, in all static specifications the
reduction of import barriers shows a positive impact on the evolution of plant
productivity in export-oriented industries relative to non-traded. However, this is
not the case for plants belonging to import-competing industries producing with
increasing returns to scale. The reduction of import barriers may prevent local firms
to exploit economies of scale since they must share the local market with foreign
competitors. Moreover, exporters’ productivity also appears to have a negative
reaction to foreign competition when a dynamic setting is considered.
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Appendix 1
Classification of industries
Export oriented industries: 311, 312, 331, 341, 372.
Import competing industries: 321, 322, 351, 354, 355, 361, 362, 381, 382, 383,
384, 385, 390.
Non-traded industries: 313, 323, 324, 332, 342, 352, 353, 356, 369, 371.
Appendix 2
See Tables 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14.
23 Just to give some examples see Cre´pon et Duguet (1997); Thingval and Podhal (2007); Blundell et al.
(1999); Nicoletti and Scarpeta (2003)
Trade integration and within-plant productivity evolution in Chile 139
123
Table 7 Variables description
Variable Data
Export border effect BX Export barriers at 2-digit industry level estimated by a gravity model
in step 2
Import border effect BM Import barriers at 2-digit industry level estimated by a gravity model
in step 2
Export oriented sector Export Dummy variable equal to one if the firm belongs to a 3 digit industry
with more than 15% of exports over output
Import competing
sector
Import Dummy variable equal to one if the firm belongs to a 3-digit industry
with more than 15% of import over output
Market concentration Herfindahl Herfindahl index of market concentration at 3-digit industry level
Pre-sample
concentration
Concentration Dummy variable equal if the average Herfindahl index in the pre-
sample
period is in the 75th percentile
Imported inputs Imported
inputs
Dummy variable equal to one if the plant reports having used imported
inputs
Credit indicator Credit Dummy variable equal to one if the plant reports having paid a loan
tax in year t
Table 8 Summary statistics by industry (2-digit ISIC Rev-2)
Labour pr. D Labour pr. S/L K/L Exports share
Food (31) 5108 (10204) 0.10 (0.66) 0.13 (0.11) 3420 (10709) 0.09 (0.2)
Textile (32) 3828 (3770) 0.07 (0.5) 0.13 (0.10) 2198 (8676) 0.02 (0.09)
Wood (33) 4099 (6428) 0.11 (0.93) 0.11 (0.10) 2192 (4143) 0.07 (0.18)
Paper (34) 7119 (9492) 0.02 (0.42) 0.17 (0.15) 4775 (14877) 0.03 (0.12)
Chemicals (35) 10832 (23366) 0.07 (0.57) 0.16 (0.11) 4793 (10573) 0.04 (0.13)
Non metallic (36) 8130 (14480) 0.09 (0.59) 0.13 (0.10) 5356 (16133) 0.01 (0.06)
Basic metals (37) 34409 (93787) 0.13 (0.71) 0.19 (0.14) 7826 (12033) 0.18 (0.31)
Machinery (38) 5375 (5987) 0.10 (0.68) 0.16 (0.13) 3122 (6519) 0.02 (0.07)
Mean of variables reported; standard deviation in parentheses
Labour pr.: labour productivity, D Labour pr.: Labour productivity growth, S/L: skill intensity,
K/L: capital intensity
Table 9 Correlation border effects at 3-digit and 2-digit industry level
1 2
BM 3digit BX 3digit
BM 2dig 0.574 (0.138)***
BX 2dig 0.195 (0.074)***
constant -1.743 (0.659)*** -0.184 (0.418)
Isic 2 dig FE Yes Yes
Number of obs 421 421
Adjusted R2 0.109 0.103
*, **, *** denote significance at the level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively
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Table 10 TFP estimates at 3-digit industry level
Industry TFP LP SD TFP FE SD TFP OLS SD
Food 7.61 1.03 8.23 1.09 5.67 0.88
Food 5.25 0.93 6.22 0.97 5.66 0.92
Beverage 6.30 0.95 9.25 1.15 6.58 0.92
Textiles 6.04 0.72 8.12 0.79 6.39 0.72
Wearing apparel 6.52 0.73 6.91 0.73 6.63 0.72
Leather 7.19 0.76 6.77 0.75 5.98 0.73
Footwear 6.56 0.67 7.46 0.72 6.37 0.66
Wood 6.99 0.85 7.39 0.85 6.30 0.81
Furniture 3.75 0.82 7.15 0.81 5.61 0.75
Paper 5.92 0.80 6.84 0.84 5.74 0.79
Printing 6.10 0.64 8.14 0.76 6.68 0.63
Chemical 9.62 1.13 10.76 1.26 6.77 0.99
Other chemicals 6.03 0.74 8.99 0.85 6.61 0.74
Petroleum 4.87 1.15 4.03 1.07 5.86 0.99
Miscellaneous prod of petroleum 9.65 1.32 12.79 1.72 7.18 1.22
Rubber 5.72 0.64 6.60 0.63 5.98 0.62
Plastic 6.19 0.77 7.13 0.75 6.90 0.75
Pottery 4.82 0.75 9.68 1.05 5.50 0.72
Glass 10.59 1.24 6.21 0.79 5.67 0.79
Non-metallic 6.92 0.94 7.53 0.97 6.38 0.90
Iron and steel 5.72 0.90 8.01 1.06 6.26 0.91
Basic metal 10.30 1.99 11.61 2.13 5.98 1.57
Metal products 6.33 0.72 7.67 0.75 6.56 0.72
Machinery 7.80 0.88 7.95 0.90 6.65 0.83
Machinery apparatus 5.55 0.82 7.19 0.84 6.22 0.80
Transport equipement 10.06 0.67 9.42 0.63 7.39 0.56
Table 11 The impact of trade barriers on plant TFP (LP) measured at 3-digit
1 2 3
TFP 2dig TFP 3dig TFP 3dig
Export -0.003 (0.109) -0.007 (0.112)
Import 0.039 (0.098) 0.049 (0.096)
Export 9 BX_3dig -0.024 (0.018) -0.033 (0.018)*
Import 9 BX_3dig -0.043 (0.008)*** -0.040 (0.008)***
Export 9 BM_3dig 0.018 (0.025) 0.031 (0.025)
Import 9 BM_3dig 0.025 (0.008)*** 0.023 (0.007)***
BX_3dig 0.009 (0.005)** 0.009 (0.005)*
BM_3dig -0.010 (0.005)** -0.010 (0.005)**
Export -0.860 (0.360)**
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Table 11 continued
1 2 3
TFP 2dig TFP 3dig TFP 3dig
Import 3.643 (0.350)***
Export 9 BX_2dig -0.031 (0.011)***
Import 9 BX_2dig -0.069 (0.010)***
Export 9 BM_2dig -0.100 (0.016)***
Import 9 BM_2dig 0.045 (0.017)***
BX_2dig 0.097 (0.011)***
BM_2dig 0.094 (0.015)***
Exit indicator -0.156 (0.019)*** -0.153 (0.019)*** -0.133 (0.014)***
Entry indicator -0.041 (0.017)** -0.042 (0.016)** -0.061 (0.016)***
Imported inputs 0.056 (0.014)*** 0.054 (0.014)*** 0.051 (0.013)***
Credit 0.010 (0.012) 0.009 (0.012) 0.022 (0.011)**
Herfindahl 0.038 (0.015)** 0.025 (0.015)* 0.001 (0.012)
constant 6.252 (0.235)*** 9.089 (0.341)*** 4.915 (0.282)***
Plant and year ind Yes Yes Yes
ISIC 3 digit Yes Yes Yes
ISIC 2 digit No No Yes
Number of obs 34391 34391 44951
Adjusted R2 0.224 0.528 0.567
Huber–White standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the plant level
*, **, *** denote significance at the level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively
Table 12 Foreign competition from low-wage and high-wage countries
1 2 3
TFP 2dig TFP 3dig TFP 3dig
BM_lw 0.029 (0.006)*** 0.029 (0.006)*** 0.007 (0.008)
BM_hw -0.033 (0.006)*** -0.033 (0.006)*** -0.012 (0.008)
Exit indicator -0.153 (0.019)*** -0.153 (0.019)*** -0.153 (0.019)***
Entry indicator -0.041 (0.016)** -0.041 (0.016)** -0.041 (0.016)**
Imported inputs 0.053 (0.014)*** 0.053 (0.014)*** 0.054 (0.014)***
Credit 0.008 (0.012) 0.008 (0.012) 0.011 (0.012)
Herfindahl 0.030 (0.015)** 0.030 (0.015)** 0.041 (0.015)***
Increasing -3.587 (0.514)*** -3.635 (0.508)***
Increasing 9 BM_lw 0.053 (0.011)***
Increasing 9 BM_hw -0.050 (0.011)***
Constant 9.030 (0.326)*** 9.830 (0.236)*** 9.859 (0.236) ***
Plant and year ind Yes Yes Yes
ISIC 3 digit Yes Yes Yes
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Table 12 continued
1 2 3
TFP 2dig TFP 3dig TFP 3dig
Number of obs 34367 34367 34367
Adjusted R2 0.522 0.521 0.521
Huber–White standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the plant level
*, **, *** denote significance at the level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively
Table 13 Distance to the frontier
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Proximity 2dig 0.217
(0.017)***
0.194
(0.022)***
BM_2dig -0.128
(0.007)***
-0.117
(0.009)***
proximity 2dig 9
BM_2dig
0.064
(0.003)***
0.053
(0.003)***
Exit indicator -0.049
(0.008)***
-0.050
(0.009)***
-0.117
(0.014)***
-0.131
(0.014)***
-0.047
(0.007)***
-0.132
(0.015)***
Entry indicator -0.005
(0.009)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.010
(0.009)
0.000
(0.000)
Imported inputs 0.015
(0.007)**
0.010
(0.007)
0.028
(0.010)***
0.050
(0.011)***
0.021
(0.007)***
0.031
(0.011)***
Credit 0.011
(0.006)*
0.004
(0.006)
0.014
(0.009)
0.014
(0.010)
0.007
(0.006)
0.016
(0.010)
Herfindahl 0.050
(0.007)***
0.038
(0.008)***
0.020
(0.010)**
-0.012
(0.011)
0.158
(0.008)***
0.014
(0.012)
TFP (t-1) 0.238
(0.006)***
0.492
(0.011)***
Proximity 2dig
(t-1)
0.010
(0.011)
0.199
(0.012)***
BM_2dig (t-1) 0.030
(0.007)***
0.032
(0.008)***
Proximity 2dig 9
BM_2dig (t-1)
-0.003
(0.002)
0.008
(0.002)***
Proximity 3dig 0.608
(0.005)***
BM_3dig 0.017
(0.003)***
Proximity 3dig 9
BM_3dig
-0.005
(0.001)***
Proximity 3dig
(t-1)
0.243
(0.006)***
BM_3dig (t-1) 0.013
(0.004)***
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Table 13 continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Proximity 3dig 9
BM_3dig (t-1)
-0.005
(0.001)***
Constant 7.522
(0.133)***
3.764
(0.197)***
2.142
(0.285)***
4.642
(0.275)***
3.698
(0.212)***
4.244
(0.303)***
Year and sector
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs 44951 33668 33668 33668 43928 31273
Adjusted R2 0.800 0.757 0.555 0.295 0.878 0.666
Marginal effects of Import barriers
Minimum -0.680
(0.029)***
-0.572
(0.037)***
0.040
(0.012)***
0.003
(0.013)
0.063
(0.010)***
0.031
(0.009)***
Mean less 1 SD -0.085
(0.006)***
-0.080
(0.007)***
0.027
(0.007)***
0.038
(0.006)***
0.016
(0.002)***
0.011
(0.003)***
Mean -0.012
(0.005)***
-0.021
(0.005)***
0.024
(0.006)***
0.047
(0.006)***
0.007
(0.001)***
0.004
(0.002)**
Mean plus 1 SD 0.061
(0.005)***
0.038
(0.006)***
0.021
(0.006)***
0.055
(0.007)***
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.003
(0.002)
Maximum 0.168
(0.008)***
0.127
(0.009)***
0.017
(0.007)**
0.068
(0.008)***
-0.026
(0.005)***
-0.021
(0.007)***
Huber–White standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the plant level
*, **, *** denote significance at the level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively
Table 14 Trade policy instruments
Year Trade policies
1975 National Agency for Export Promotion: to promote Chilean’s exports by improving the
international insertion of Chilean’s firms
1976 Elimination of all non-tariffs barriers
1979 Uniform import tariff of 10%
1980 Economic complementation agreements: Latin American Integration Association (ALADI)
Export Promotion Programme: to supply information on foreign markets and customers, promoting
Chilean exports through generic publicity and targeted missions, and working to resolve the
administrative problems faced by exporters
1983 Increase import tariff to 20%
1984 Increase import tariff to 35%
1985 Reduction of import tariffs to 20%
Economic Positioning Campaign: to diffuse the country image in external markets. The
programme is financed and organized jointly by PROCHILE and other organizations
1988 Reduction of import tariffs to 15%
1991 Reduction of import tariffs to 11%
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